Patricia Marins tweeted:
US-Israel munitions burn: $10-16 billion in the fist 4 days alone
The Payne Institute conducted a detailed ledger study tracking the types and quantities of munitions expended during the first 96 hours of the conflict. According to their analysis, 5,197 projectiles were fired.
A few days ago, I highlighted the emerging shortages, not only of air-defense interceptors, but also of precision-guided munitions.
This concern is now strongly validated by the Payne Institute’s findings, which show that up to one-third of certain critical stockpiles were consumed in just four days.
Considering the 55-65% decline in Iranian attack intensity observed over the past week, a 17-day projection of total munitions expenditure puts the estimated cost at an average of $22-30 billion for offensive and defensive weapons combined.
For defensive systems specifically, I applied the Hudson Institute’s estimate of a roughly 75% reduction in Iranian missile and drone launches.
The most alarming finding is that this calculation points to the near-exhaustion of Israel’s Arrow interceptors and places several other systems in critically low stock levels. It also indicates that stocks of key precision-guided munitions are rapidly approaching depletion.
This is a serious problem because both advanced interceptors and precision munitions have relatively slow production cycles.
This situation once again highlights what experts call America’s “industrial resilience gap”, especially when it comes to the rare minerals and raw materials needed to produce more advanced missiles and munitions.
We already saw the same weakness during the Ukraine war in 2023–2024.
Even before the Iran conflict began, the United States had started slowing down arms deliveries to Europe. The truth is that replacing spent ammunition is not something you can solve overnight with extra money or a presidential order.
It depends on a long, fragile supply chain that starts with mining critical minerals and explosive chemicals, passes through specialized component suppliers, and only ends at certified factories that simply cannot be switched to full speed on demand because U.S isn’t a war economy.
This is not solely an American problem, it affects the entire Western alliance. There is insufficient control over the strategic supply chains required for a prolonged high-intensity conflict.
We may be seeing a clear example of something very important: in a high-intensity war against a serious opponent, the weapons and ammunition you start with are basically all you’re going to have for a very long time.
This is happening because neither side can produce new supplies fast enough. The coalition’s factories are limited by how quickly they can work and by shortages of key raw materials. At the same time, Iran’s hidden underground production lines face the same constraints, even planned for this situation, they simply can’t keep up either.
From a functional perspective, a stalemate appears almost inevitable. When combined with mounting political-economic pressure, this dynamic will likely force a negotiated settlement, placing significantly heavier pressure on the United States than on other actors.